RESOLVING THE LEDGER
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Iran displays Zolfaghar and Qadr missiles alongside a model of a mini submarine at Azadi Square in Tehran, Iran on July 24, 2026. —Fatemeh Bahrami-Anadolu via Getty Images
The United States and Iran are again at war. The renewed conflict is not about Iran's nuclear program or regime change, but over the Strait of Hormuz through which a fifth of the world's oil must pass.
For two weeks, American missiles have struck Iran. In turn, Iran has retaliated against American allies: Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan. Four U.S. soldiers have been killed and 142 wounded; at least 53 Iranians have been killed and 592 injured since July 6. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) claimed to have destroyed an oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. Traffic in the strait has slowed to a trickle and oil prices have jumped again.
The ceasefire and the initial agreement signed on Jun. 17 lasted barely three weeks, undone by rival readings of a deliberately vague text. Washington wanted free navigation in Hormuz restored; Tehran insisted that it was the master of the strait. When traffic resumed, ships and tankers avoided the mined central route of the strait and hugged its southern coast close to Oman under American protection or sailed along the northern coast of Hormuz close to Iran, where it levied a “toll” for safe passage.
On July 7, the IRGC fired on ships defying routes designated by Iran; American airstrikes followed. Three days later, on July 10, President Donald Trump notified Congress that the war between the U.S. and Iran had resumed. Iran formally suspended the agreement, citing strikes, sanctions and Israel's operations in Lebanon.
The costs are mounting. For decades, maritime traffic from Saudi Arabia, whose eastern border sits on the Persian Gulf, has passed through Hormuz to reach the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Since the closure of Hormuz, the Kingdom has been moving roughly four million barrels a day—around four times its pre-war volume—through the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, along its western border.
But the Red Sea has a chokepoint of its own: the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, at its southern end, off the coast of Yemen, which connects it to the Gulf of Aden and the broader Arabian Sea. On July 20, the Houthis, Iran’s allies in Yemen, declared a maritime embargo on Saudi Arabia at Bab al-Mandab, invoking “ an eye for an eye .” They have already struck two Saudi tankers in the Red Sea. With the chokepoints of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab now contested simultaneously, the Gulf's energy systems face an unprecedented strain.
American strikes have targeted Iran’s southern coastline and the approaches to Hormuz, with inland strikes largely reserved for the missile bases that allow Iran to reach the U.S. bases across the region. Its intensity is lower than the 40-day military campaign that preceded it, and it is an open-ended campaign: a war of attrition fought over a waterway. This is, for now, a bilateral contest, with Washington keeping Israel outside the frame for as long as Iran refrains from striking Israeli territory directly.
American objectives have contracted to reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Having survived the war and denied the U.S. and Israel their stated aims, Iran now regards the outcome as a victory and is working to shape and cement its terms.
Why Iran thinks it has won
Iran has managed to impose significant human and material costs. The war has already cost the U.S. more than $37.5 billion , 18 U.S. service members have been killed and 624 have been injured. Wartime learning, intelligence and technological cooperation with Russia and China, and better access to satellite imagery have markedly improved Iran’s missile and drone strike accuracy. And Iran has been able to rattle the global energy markets by closing the Strait of Hormuz, weaponizing a chokepoint that offers continuous leverage over the global economy.
Iranian strategists are aiming for something more ambitious: raising the cost of hosting American forces until the U.S. thins out its regional military presence. The U.S. has indeed moved some military assets away from the Persian Gulf toward Jordan and Israel. American radars, bases and surveillance systems across the Arab states also function as early-warning systems for Israel. Iran’s concentrated attacks on those systems in March and April likely improved its ability to attack Israel with its long-range missiles.
Tehran seems to hope that a combination of its control of Hormuz and the coercive power of its drones and missiles would make the Gulf states reluctant to host U.S. forces and facilitate military operations against Iran. That instead, the Gulf states would seek security arrangements with the Islamic Republic.
Iran is also tailoring its approach to different Gulf countries: it has no appetite for a direct war with Saudi Arabia, so the Houthis in Yemen carry the Saudi file. The Houthis imposed their embargo on the Bab al-Mandab Strait on July 20, days after Iranian officials signaled that the strait would close if American strikes on Iran’s infrastructure continued. The Houthis had their own reasons to move, especially Riyadh’s siege of Yemeni ports and a military strike on Sanaa airport. But either way, Tehran gained a second strategic chokepoint.
Intense Iranian attacks on Kuwait are the lesson intended for every Gulf state hosting U.S. forces. Kuwait facilitated American strikes on Iran from its territory, and Iranian drones have answered by striking the power and desalination plants that Kuwait depends on for roughly 90% of its drinking water. The strikes on Kuwait are also aimed at degrading a potential staging ground for a potential U.S. ground operation in southern Iran.
What this strategy lacks is a clear account of how Iran would convert wartime leverage into a durable political settlement. Tehran has shown how it can disrupt global energy supplies and impose costs on the U.S. and its allies, but it is not clear how it can remai...
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