Whoops, Apocalypse! Why Five Conflicts Could Become One World War

0 Share Newsweek is a Trust Project member See more of our trusted coverage when you search. Prefer Newsweek on Google to see more of our trusted coverage when you search. The war between the United States and Iran began as a regional confrontation with global economic consequences. It could remain that way, but the situation also contains a far darker possibility: as in 1914, a series of individually rational decisions by world powers could lead to international catastrophe.

Unresolved flash points current and potential—Ukraine, the Gulf, Yemen, Lebanon and Taiwan—could begin reinforcing one another until every major power finds itself committed to multiple fronts simultaneously. The global tension could reshape the calculations of Russia, China, Europe and the United States in ways that trigger interlocking escalation.

Suppose the present stalemate continues. The Strait of Hormuz—and America’s Gulf allies—remain subject to repeated Iranian harassment. Iran’s Houthis proxies disrupt traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb, placing both access points to the Arabian Peninsula under persistent pressure. America continues responding with intermittent strikes against Iranian military assets and proxy forces while insisting that diplomacy remains possible. Tehran continues demanding the right to control tax shipping through Hormuz .

Meanwhile, the global economic consequences stack up. The world's energy markets depend upon the uninterrupted flow of oil and liquefied natural gas through the Persian Gulf. The Red Sea remains one of the principal arteries connecting Europe and Asia. Every week of disruption increases insurance premiums, extends shipping routes, raises transportation costs and feeds global inflation. Fertilizer markets tighten, aviation fuel becomes more expensive and supply chains collapse.

To restore freedom of navigation, military planners begin examining how greater pressure can be applied not only to Iran itself, but to the network through which it projects power across the region.

The Houthis present the most immediate problem. For more than a decade, Saudi Arabia tried and failed to defeat them, and Riyadh has little appetite for restarting that war alone. Yet so long as the Houthis retain the ability to close the Bab el-Mandeb, they can threaten one of the world’s principal commercial arteries, cripple traffic through the Suez Canal and deprive Egypt of desperately needed hard currency. They must be somehow crushed.

Hezbollah presents a parallel opportunity in Lebanon. Syria joins efforts to sever Iran's supply routes and military infrastructure, while the Lebanese state moves against Hezbollah from within. What had long been treated as an Israeli problem is recast as an effort to restore Lebanese sovereignty.

The Popular Mobilization Forces then turn Iraq into a third front. As Iranian-backed militias intensify attacks on American facilities, Kurdish forces and coalition supply lines, Washington reinforces its presence in Iraqi Kurdistan to protect coalition operations, strengthen the Kurds and preserve the ability to strike the PMF throughout Iraq. Iraq once again becomes an arena.

NATO is now on side. The U.S., with NATO backing, has seized Kharg Island, Iran’s critical oil depot, and Qeshm Island, central to its control of Hormuz. Neither operation produces Iranian capitulation or restores free passage through the Gulf.

Iran is protected by mountains, immense distances and limited avenues of approach, but its regional network is increasingly exposed. The coalition may still insist that it is not pursuing regime change. Tehran, Beijing and Moscow see the U.S. assembling the military architecture for just that.

That transforms the strategic calculations of every major power.

Russia, China and North Korea recognize that they share a common strategic interest: none wishes to see the Iranian regime collapse under American military pressure, with the U.S. emerging from the Gulf with enhanced influence over one of the world's most important energy corridors. All recognize that a prolonged conflict consumes military resources, industrial production and political attention that Washington might devote elsewhere.

Beijing need not send combat divisions. It can expand deliveries of dual-use electronics, industrial equipment, drones, missile technologies, satellite support, financial assistance and intelligence while shielding Iran diplomatically from efforts at the UN Security Council to legitimize wider military action. The objective is to ensure that America cannot achieve a decisive outcome at acceptable cost. China is now openly a U.S. military rival.

For Moscow, the military partnership already forged with Tehran during the Ukraine war deepens further as Russia expands deliveries of air-defense systems, electronic warfare capabilities, intelligence, advisers and advanced military technologies. Every additional month that the United States remains preoccupied in the Gulf improves Moscow's strategic position in Ukraine, and toward Europe.

North Korea fits in naturally, having already demonstrated its willingness to exchange artillery ammunition, ballistic missiles and manpower for Russian economic assistance and advanced military technology. So China, Russia, Iran and North Korea begin acting as a loose strategic coalition—an Axis—whose members support one another because each benefits from exhausting the military and political capacity of the U.S. and its allies.

The longer the Middle Eastern crisis persists, the more attractive it becomes for rival powers to exploit Washington's distraction.

Ukraine has stabilized the front and developed the ability to strike deep into Russia's military economy. Long-range drone attacks increasingly damage oil infrastructure, defense production and other strategic targets, turning Russia's vast geography into a military liability. Yet the widening Middle Eastern war imposes a severe cost on Kyiv. American and allied stocks of a...

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